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Abstract
This paper analyzes the 2006 World Baseball Classic as a promotional strategy by Major League
Baseball to further its global branding pursuits. The WBC is qualified as a global sport event
that is a marketing function of MLB in its efforts to emerge as an international brand; elements of
the WBC are examined in the context of a global brand strategy. WBC promotional execution
elements are studied in light of dimensions upon which consumers evaluate global brands. Four
customer segments targeted through the WBC are characterized before the paper examines future
WBC marketing approaches in the context of cultural production.
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Overview of World Baseball Classic
After years of planning, Major League
Baseball (MLB) staged an international baseball
tournament known as the World Baseball
Classic (WBC) from March 3-20, 2006.
Formally approved by MLB owners in 2004,
World Baseball Classic, Inc., is a company
created by MLB and the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) labor union
to operate the WBC tournament, which is
sanctioned by the International Baseball
Federation and is supported by professional
baseball leagues and players associations around
the world (MLB.com, 2006). According to
Paul Archey, MLB’s senior vice president of
international business operations, the purpose
of the WBC was to “build a platform where the
best players in the game could play on behalf
of their countries and get baseball better global
exposure” (Lefton, 2006).
The WBC staged 39 games at seven
international venues over 18 days (“Final

WBC,” 2006; Fisher, 2006b). The tournament,
which featured three rounds of competition,
sold 737,112 tickets, was broadcast in
nine languages, and was covered by 5,354
credentialed media members (Bloom, 2006;
“Final WBC,” 2006). In the championship
game, Japan defeated Cuba 10-6 to claim the
title for the inaugural tournament that featured
16 competing teams (see Table 1).
Financially, the WBC was deemed successful,
with MLB garnering an estimated $10-15
million past costs of $45-50 million, buoyed
by $5 million in television rights fees paid to it
by ESPN only three months in advance of the
tournament (Fatsis, 2006). Half of the profits
went to the MLBPA, and half went to the
baseball federations of the participating nations
in order of their tournament finish. Television
ratings for the tournament were deemed solid
in the U.S. and soared in Asian and Latin
American nations, including a 36 share in Japan
for that country’s semifinal game with Korea
(Bloom, 2006; Fatsis, 2006).
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Beyond the revenue generation capabilities of
the tournament and the worldwide excitement
that overrode initial waves of skepticism
and apathy, MLB’s vision for the WBC was
to create a platform from which it could
market itself and the sport of baseball on a
greater international level, according to MLB
Commissioner Allan H. “Bud” Selig (Bloom,
2008a).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze
the 2006 World Baseball Classic as a global
branding promotional strategy by Major
League Baseball to further its global branding
pursuits. This strategy will be examined in
light of marketing theories concerning sport
event scope (Shani & Sandler, 1996), a fourstep global brand strategy (Gillespie, Jeannet,
& Hennessey, 2007), consumer evaluations of
global brands, global consumer segments (Holt,
Quelch, & Taylor, 2004), cultural production
(Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).
Table 1
National Teams Participating in the Inaugural 2006
World Baseball Classic By Pool			
Pool A

Pool B

Pool C

Pool D

China

Canada

Cuba

Australia

Chinese Mexico
Netherlands
Taipei 			

Dominican
Republic

Japan

South Africa Panama

Italy

Korea

United States Puerto Rico

Venezuela

Source: “Final WBC,” 2006

Overview of Globalization
Because of its complex and multifaceted
nature, precisely defining the term globalization
becomes difficult and can be approached from
numerous perspectives (Anderson, 2004).
Some of the more prominent perspectives of
globalization involve concepts of economic
76

transition, including that of Rodrick (1997),
who defines the term as “the international
integration of markets for goods, services,
and capital” (p. 1). One of the more widely
embraced definitions of the term is offered
by Friedman (1999), who defines globalization
as “the integration of capital, technology, and
information across national borders in a way
that is creating a single global market and, to
some degree, a global village” (dust jacket).
Other characterizations of globalization include
historical and political shifting (Toulmin,
1999), and even a multifaceted conglomeration
of connective processes that involve every
aspect of life on the planet and that have been
unfolding over the entire course of human
evolution (Anderson, 2004).
However, consensus among later expert
writings on globalization indicates that the
phenomenon cannot be accurately characterized
by singularly oriented definitions of the term.
Waters (1995) defines globalization as “a social
process in which the constraints of geography
on social and cultural arrangements recede and
in which people become increasingly aware that
they are receding” (p. 3) and offered discussion
of three distinct yet equally important arenas of
social life in which discussion of globalization
could be contextualized: the economy, the
polity, and the culture. In seeking to build on
Waters’ (1995) conceptualization and widen
the definitive scope for the term, Anderson
(2004) offers a brief but broadly reaching list
of human processes that have been accelerating
because of globalization: human mobility,
information technology, communications
technology, organizations, and international
trade/investment. Anderson (2004) further
postulates that these processes are each
evolving concurrently, frequently overlapping,
and often are reinforcing one other, creating an
environment that is simultaneously problematic
and promising.
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MLB & Globalization
MLB is no stranger to far-reaching global
business initiatives in recent decades. Typical
of their era-specific organizational strategy and
pioneering efforts to comb and farm the globe
for baseball talent, the Los Angeles Dodgers
franchise sent a contingent of executives
and coaches to China in 1980 (Henson,
2008c). While its 2008 season-opening series
between the defending World Series champion
Boston Red Sox and Oakland Athletics drew
considerable attention, the series was the third
time MLB opened its season in Tokyo (also
done in 2000 and 2004), and the fifth non-U.S.
opening series, including Monterrey, Mexico in
1999 and San Juan, Puerto Rico in 2001 (MLB.
com, 2007). However, aside from location,
these initiatives lacked strong local connections,
presence past one or two games, and perpetuity.
Prior to the WBC, many pundits and
certain MLB stakeholder groups widely
and vocally expressed pessimism about the
event, calling it a futile attempt by MLB
to create an international tournament
equivalent to the Fédération Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup
soccer tournament (Bloom, 2006; Fisher,
2005). However, Selig and other MLB senior
officials persisted in their establishment of
the event as a tool to perpetuate and enhance
internationalization of the sport of baseball,
as well as to create interest in the sport within
nations where none previously existed (Bloom,
2006). After the WBC, Selig stated, “…by any
stretch of the imagination, this tournament
exceeded my expectations in a myriad of ways”
(Bloom, 2006, ¶ 2).
Why globalization for MLB?
In assessing MLB’s logic for undertaking the
WBC, MLB President Bob DuPuy stated, “Our
world has become increasingly smaller. As a
result, entertainment product—our product—is
going to be worldwide. You can’t be parochial

anymore. It can’t just be about the United
States” (King, 2006, ¶ 50).
Reasons for MLB’s focus on global growth
are numerous yet are not unique to major
professional sport properties. First, as
sport crosses international boundaries with
increasing regularity due to the influx of
worldwide talent, global television audiences,
and greater access to licensed merchandise,
globalization has become a top priority of all
major U.S. sports properties (Barr & Hums,
1998; Fullerton, 2007; Gladden & Lizandra,
1998). These sports properties seek growth
outside American borders both to showcase
their sports to international audiences, thereby
encouraging international participation; and to
increase consumption of their own particular
product(s) (Fay, 2003; Gladden & Lizandra,
1998; Lizandra & Vail, 2005). Efforts to exploit
such opportunities typically involve movement
in three primary areas: development of the live
audience size and/or experience, development
of the media-based audience size and/or
experience, and the expansion of related
merchandise, sporting goods, and licensed
items (Fullerton, 2007).
Concurrent to the previous general discussion
of the phenomenon of globalization, Gladden
and Lizandra (1998) indicate that sport is
subjected to many of the same forces that
are presently increasing global distribution
of consumer and entertainment products.
Gladden and Lizandra (1998) also highlight the
maturation of American sports markets and the
relatively unsaturated nature of overseas sports
markets, as well as technological advances
and availability, which increase international
accessibility.
Globalization is also a major focus within the
arena of competition for most major American
sports properties, with perhaps the exception
of the National Football League (NFL). Like
the National Hockey League (NHL) has done
for decades, and like the National Basketball
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Association (NBA) in the 21st Century, MLB
has become dependent on international talent
pools, not only for developmental league and
journeyman players, but for its marquee talent
(Fay, 2003).
Context of WBC Event
Though the terms international and global
may be interchangeable in most contexts, two
constructs offered Shani and Sandler (1996)
and Gillespie, Jeannet, and Hennessey (2007)
that can appropriately contextualize the WBC
make distinctions between the two terms in
order to differentiate events and brands seeking
to compete on a worldwide level.
To determine the precise context of an event,
Shani and Sandler (1996) offer a five-tiered
classification system called The Sports Event
Pyramid (see Figure 1) based on two criteria:
width, or the geographic reach of the event,
which may span worldwide, across one or two
countries, within an area of a country, or within
a specific community; and depth, or the level of
interest in the event, which may be great or low.
Accordingly, on the top tier of events are ones
that have worldwide width coupled with great
depth, which are classified as global events,
e.g., the Olympic Games and FIFA World
Cup. Events on the second tier are classified
as international events; these events may have:
national width and great depth, e.g., the Union
of European Football Associations (UEFA)
Cup in soccer; or global width with low depth,
e.g., the Wimbledon tennis tournament and
the Tour de France bicycle race. Events on the
third tier are classified as national events and
are characterized by great national width and
great depth, e.g., MLB’s World Series. Fourthtier events are classified as regional events
having narrow national width and great depth
within a specific area of a country, e.g., the
Southeastern Conference (SEC) men’s college
basketball tournament. Events on the fifth tier
are classified as local events with narrow width
and low depth, e.g., a specific minor league
78

baseball team.
Context of MLB Brand
The terms global and international are also
distinguished in the context of branding, as
offered by Gillespie et al. (2007). A global
brand implements a marketing strategy that
is standardized across all national markets yet
adapts key elements of the marketing mix (e.g.,
product features, distribution, and promotion)
to local tastes, while an international brand
follows a general global strategy but does not
maintain a strictly standardized marketing
strategy or marketing mix across all national
markets.
When conjoinedly considering Shani and
Sandler’s (1996) Sports Event Pyramid and
Gillespie et al.’s (2007) branding distinction,
MLB must contextualize the WBC as a global
event with worldwide width and great depth,
but because of the varying impact of the
sport of baseball around the world, MLB
must market itself as an international brand.
Specific reasons why MLB must market itself
with differentiated marketing strategies and
marketing mixes are detailed in the following
three sections about the WBC global branding
strategy, consumer evaluations of global
brands, and MLB’s consideration of cultural
production.
WBC’s Four-Step Global Brand Strategy
Gillespie et al. (2007) advocate four steps in
developing and administering a global brand:
identifying consumer needs, communicating
brand identity, tracking global brand identity,
and determining the movement of branding
decisions. These four steps can clearly be seen
when examining MLB’s construct of the WBC.
Identifying Consumer Needs
In the initial step, a firm must identify
recurring customer needs worldwide and
determine how its brand can bring both
functional and emotional benefits to these
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customers (Gillespie et al., 2007). Though
perhaps the functionality of the MLB
brand could be disputed in its purest sense
(as compared to food, clothing, shelter,
transportation, etc.), according to Schirato
(2007), sport can exist as entertainment to serve
the leisure needs of the population, therefore
qualifying MLB’s brand of professional baseball
as one with the capacity to deliver functional
benefits.
Emotional benefits of the inaugural WBC
were well documented by media accounts of
the unbridled nationalism by fans attending
WBC games, including the Dominican fans’
formation of a conga line and orchestration of
rudimentary musical instruments; the complete
filling of lower-level seats by Dominican and
Venezuelan fans to watch batting practice 90
minutes prior to the start of a game between
the two countries; the rabid West Coast support
of the Japanese and Korean teams; the request
from Cuba to play the WBC every two years
instead of every four years; and flag-waving
pageantry from Dominican and Venezuelan
fans of such magnitude and proportions that
Selig cited it as his personal favorite WBC
moment (Bloom, 2006).
Such passion was also a critical measure
of success for WBC sponsors, who in some
cases had directly pinned the success of their
marketing campaigns to the transference of
the passion generated by the implosion of
nationalism and the sport of baseball directly to
their brands. One such sponsor was Empresas
Polar, Venezuela’s largest brewery and a 10year veteran of MLB sponsorships in that
country, which placed its logo on the jerseys of
the Venezuelan team, whose sports marketing
director described the fans’ passion exhibited at
the Orlando, Florida, tournament site as “very
valuable” to his company’s brand (King, 2006,
¶ 7).

Figure 1
The Sports Event Pyramid

Global
Events
International
Events
National
Events
Regional
Events
Local
Events

Source: Shani & Sandler (1996)

Communicating Brand Identity
The second step proposed by Gillespie et
al. (2007) is the establishment of a process to
communicate the brand’s identity to consumers,
channels, and the firm’s own employees.
Concerning the WBC, MLB did this on both
big-picture and small-picture levels.
From a gestalt perspective, MLB officials and
other experts clearly indicated that the purpose
of the WBC was to build a bridge to audiences
outside the United States: “The impression
I got was that this was more important…
for the international teams than it was for the
U.S. team and the general-market audiences,”
said Raul Lopez, president of a multicultural
marketing research company (Fatsis, 2006, ¶
13). In a response to a question about the U.S.
team’s elimination from the tournament after
six games, Selig expressed no remorse or any
preconceived notion (officially or personally)
that MLB had in any way established the U.S.
team’s success as MLB’s benchmark for WBC
success. Instead, he directly stated MLB’s
desire to globalize the MLB brand through the
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WBC regardless of the fate of the U.S team:
“We were here not only to perpetuate and
enhance the internationalization of the sport,
but to create interest in a lot of places where
there hasn’t been any. And we’ve achieved that”
(Bloom, 2006, ¶ 17). Specifically, according to
MLB’s Executive Vice President for Business
Tim Brosnan, the inclusion of teams from
fledgling baseball nations such as China, South
Africa, and Italy (with MLB All-Star catcher
Mike Piazza on its roster) in the tournament
were direct efforts to initiate and cultivate
interesting fledgling markets; Brosnan also
promised exponentially increased short-term
activity in China, as well as the consideration
of exhibition and even regular-season games in
Europe soon (Fatsis, 2006). Brosnan’s promises
were kept in short order as MLB staged two
March 2008 exhibition games in Beijing and
began its 2008 regular season with a series in
Japan, as discussed in the Conclusions section
of this article (MLB.com, 2007; Wade, 2008b).
Aside from these big-picture efforts to
communicate brand identity, specific immediate
steps were also taken to drive the MLB/WBC
message. In the weeks prior to the WBC, MLB
media partner ESPN intensified its promotional
efforts concerning the tournament. The
network launched an aggressive multimedia
campaign to create excitement about the
tournament, devoted daily coverage to the
WBC on its “Baseball Tonight” program, and
assigned its lead baseball broadcast team of Jon
Miller and Joe Morgan to the semifinal and final
games (Fisher, 2006b).
Tracking Global Brand Identity
The third step proposed by Gillespie et al.
(2007) is the establishment of a method for
tracking the success of the global identity of
the brand and monitoring customers’ opinions.
Fortunately for MLB, a multitude of both
traditional and cutting-edge options are at its
disposal.
By traditional measures of television ratings
80

and ticket sales, which were reported to be the
primary focus of some MLB executives (Fisher,
2006b), the WBC was considered successful.
TV ratings proved vital in gauging fan interest
during the WBC; the Japan-Korea semifinal
game garnered a 36 share in Japan and was
watched on nearly half the TV sets in South
Korea (Bloom, 2006). Overall TV ratings across
the globe were deemed “solid” by The Wall
Street Journal, boosted particularly by Asian
and Latin American ratings and even American
ratings on ESPN, which attracted an average
of 1.4 million viewers, despite airing less than
half of the WBC games on ESPN and ESPN2
(Fatsis, 2006, ¶ 4). Ticket sales figures, another
standard measure of event success, totaled
just over 92% of pre-tournament expectations
but were still considered successful, as sellouts
were the norm in every tournament venue
except the Asian bracket, which was played in
Japan’s Tokyo Dome and drew less than the
expected 80% building capacity (Bloom, 2006).
Another noteworthy factor concerning ticket
sales was the robust secondary ticket market
that developed at the early-round Orlando
and final/semifinal San Diego, California, sites
(Fisher, 2006b).
With fluctuating media traffic patterns created
by new media, traditional forms of tracking
customers (e.g., TV ratings, ticket sales, etc.)
could soon be all but obsolete in tracking
a brand’s global identity and monitoring
customers’ opinions, even in live event-centered
businesses and sport properties like MLB. Even
modern media such as Internet websites and
mobile-phone websites are rapidly becoming
outdated forms of digital customer interaction
as online virtual communities emerge. In these
virtual communities, users no longer simply
view, post, and/or interact with content (as with
typical websites or MySpace pages), or simply
become the receiving end of a unidirectional
message as they passively view live or stored
streaming video content (as with MLB’s MLB.
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TV). Instead, new technology is changing the
notion that an entertainment experience only
exists within the confines of a facility (Brooks,
2006).
One example of such next-generation
cyber-activity is the all-inclusive virtual online
community Second Life in which individuals
assume self-created three-dimensional virtual
identities, navigate through a myriad of
3D virtual communities and locations (e.g.,
nightclubs and performance centers), and make
purchases using an online currency (“Linden”)
available for purchase with credit or debit cards
(Brooks, 2006). However, the primary draw of
Second Life is the social interaction with other
users, which can be done simultaneously with
event interaction, too. MLB’s initial experiment
with this format came in the summer of
2006 as it broadcasted its annual Home Run
Derby (held at Pittsburgh’s PNC Park) in a
virtual Second Life baseball park. According
to MLB interactive media officials and project
designers, the foray was a natural fit as MLB,
which already boasts strong online game-cast
consumption at its MLB.com website, seeks to
expand the ballgame experience outside of the
ballpark in conjunction with its existing online
presence (Brooks, 2006).
Such a mode of consumerism would give
MLB critical advantages in tracking its global
brand identity. First, the thoroughness of the
virtual experience, which will likely far outpace
the current levels of interactivity to which
consumers can ascribe, will likely provide
MLB with more accurate, detailed consumer
behavior metrics. Second, such an experience
could take the MLB event-based experience to
global dimensions via an acceptable standard of
virtual reality with which global consumers are
already comfortable. Third, such an experience
would be available worldwide, allowing both
novice and connoisseur fans alike to not only
consume MLB-produced content, but to
potentially interact with each other while doing

so, providing a more effective environment in
which to nurture emerging fans.
Determining the Movement of Branding Decisions
The fourth and final step proposed by
Gillespie et al. (2007) in developing and
administering a global brand strategy is to
determine the direction of the movement of
branding decisions, which may be either of
two directions: the top-down approach, in
which a global management team determines
the global brand strategy from which countryspecific branding strategies are derived; or
the bottom-up approach, in which country
strategies emerge from shared experiences and
best practices across common elements among
subsidiaries.
Though global movement on the MLB brand
is clearly a top-shelf priority of its upperlevel management team, regarding this fourth
step (especially in light of the WBC), MLB
is apparently building unique, individualized,
country-specific strategies that reflect a bottomup approach in branding decisions. MLB
international marketing and development
personnel indicate that strategies and dynamics
of selling the game must be customized not by
continent and region but by country, a branding
strategy at least 15 years old (King, 2006).
Though common ground exists across regions
(e.g., highly popular product coupled with weak
economics in Latin America; popular product
and solid economics coupled with drastic time
zone differences in Eastern Asia; and Europe’s
fledgling state of the game coupled with the
need for grassroots movements), general
geographic plans are not enough. Archey cites
the diametric Eastern Asia opposites of Japan
and Korea, which he said share very little
except geographic proximity (King, 2006).
Managed differences from country to country
span both on-field and off-field elements. For
example, in China, much of MLB’s efforts
center on player development to produce a
Chinese major leaguer on the order of the
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NBA’s Yao Ming in order to capture the interest
of the massive Chinese market (King, 2006).
Such efforts appear to be close to fruition with
the New York Yankees’ signing of two Chinese
players, one of whom played in the WBC, on
June 18, 2007, followed closely by the Seattle
Mariners’ signing of two other Chinese players
on June 20, 2007, both of whom played in the
WBC (“Mariners follow,” 2007; “Yankees sign,”
2007).
On-field player development efforts quickly
led to off-field development efforts. Just eight
days after signing the two Chinese players, the
Yankees became the first MLB club to sign a
sponsorship with a Chinese company when the
Yili Group, China’s leading dairy enterprise,
inked a deal to receive advertising exposure
at Yankee Stadium and in the official Yankees
program magazine (“Yankees first,” 2007).
Groundwork on this Asian front, however,
had been in place since MLB opened its
Tokyo office in 2005. Since then, its number
of multiyear Asian sponsorships increased
from 20% before the office’s opening to
60% in 2006 due to direct efforts to educate
Asian sponsors about the inherent value in
multiyear sponsorships as opposed to singleyear, advertising based sponsorships (King,
2006). These initiatives likely led to a 2008
deal in which Japan’s Nippon Life Insurance
Company formed a marketing relationship with
the Chicago Cubs and their Japanese outfielder
Kosuke Fukudome that included in-stadium
signage, tickets, special events, and media
backdrop signage for Fukudome interviews
(“Coast-to-Coast,” 2008).
Furthermore, on the off-field Latin American
front, MLB has eliminated a unilateral Spanish
broadcast feed to all its Latin American
countries and allowed broadcast teams from
each nation to dub in their own announcers,
resulting in a more easily understood and widely
accepted broadcast (King, 2006).

82

Consumer Evaluations of Global Brands
In their essay on how to rethink global
branding, Holt, Quelch, and Taylor (2004)
examine a 1983 article by Levitt, which declared
that, at that time, a global market for uniform
products and services had emerged, and that
companies should exploit such economics of
simplicity and expand by selling standardized
products worldwide, which would ensure cost
savings and consistent communication. Holt
et al. (2004) argue that instead, consumers
in most countries could not relate well
to the subsequent generic products and
communications spawned by companies’ leastcommon-denominator strategies. Furthermore,
based on a study of brand preferences and
perceptions of consumers across the globe,
Holt et al. (2004) offer a theoretical construct
of important dimensions of global brands and
categorized global consumer segments into four
groups; both of these conclusions can clearly
be illustrated by a detailed examination of
MLB’s efforts with the WBC.
Dimensions
After a qualitative study of consumers in 41
countries to identify key characteristics which
consumers associate with global brands and a
quantitative study of 1,800 people in 12 nations
to measure the relative importance of those
dimensions when consumers buy products,
Holt et al.’s (2004) analysis revealed three
characteristics which consumers associate with
global brands and utilize to evaluate them when
making purchase decisions: quality signal, global
myth, and social responsibility.
Quality Signal
Regarding the first dimension, Holt et al.
(2004) concluded that international consumers
are impressed by brands’ quality, excitement,
innovation, and global reach. Aside from
product/guarantee superiority, respondents
indicated that their excitement was driven
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by the development of new products and
breakthrough technologies, as well as their
inherent perception of global-ness. MLB’s
launch of an international tournament dually
qualifies as a new/breakthrough initiative and a
direct effort to drive international perception of
the sport of baseball as a global one. Coupled
with its foray into cutting-edge technological
frontiers described in the previous section,
MLB’s launch of the WBC appears to firmly
indicate a wholly reformulated strategy of the
game’s highest professional-level property to
move the tradition-laden, pastoral sport often
billed as the American pastime from one built
almost exclusively around American values
to one that is keenly interested in becoming a
global game (King, 2006: Schirato, 2007). Tim
Brosnan, MLB’s executive vice president for
business, explicitly stated just days prior to the
tournament that MLB “can’t make a business
out of tradition” (Fisher, 2006a, ¶ 5) while
noted sport economist Andrew Zimbalist
commented that the WBC’s revenue-sharing
formula, new-media business, and cooperation
with the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA) labor union indicated
“the beginning of a new mentality” of MLB
franchise owners from a culture of division and
selfishness to one of risk-taking, partnership,
and collective sacrifice in an effort to globalize
the game (Fatsis, 2006, ¶ 8; Fisher, 2006b).
Global Myth
The second dimension of global brands is
the capability to create a shared global identity
that gives consumers a perceived cosmopolitan
lifestyle, known as global myth, in which they
share an imagined global identity with likeminded people, feel a sense of belonging
to something bigger, and ascribe to desired
qualities (Holt et al., 2004). A careful analysis of
the 2006 WBC team/country profiles compiled
by King (2006) reveals that MLB utilized global
myth regarding the WBC to nations outside
the U.S. with two distinct combinations of two

variables: emphasis on competition and sources
of sponsorships.
Discounting countries with both wellestablished presence and well-established/
growing economies (based on their gross
domestic product totals and rankings) in which
MLB already has a strong foothold (Australia,
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Korea, and U.S.),
the remainder of the WBC field consisted
mostly of teams whose nations mostly had
the combination of either a well-established
baseball presence with a weak economy
(Chinese Taipei, Dominican Republic, Panama,
and Venezuela), or a weak baseball presence
with a well-established/growing economy (Italy,
China, and the Netherlands). In developing
baseball countries with established/growing
economies yet less competitive teams, MLB
perpetuated the global myth with sponsorships
from global brands, e.g., Anheuser-Busch,
MasterCard, and PepsiCo, that involved heavy
worldwide sales pitches, particularly in Asia
and Latin America, and a lessened emphasis
on competitive elements (Fisher, 2005,
2006b; Lefton, 2006). On the other hand,
in established baseball countries with weak
economies, MLB placed heavy emphasis on
the global competition elements of the WBC
and the combination of baseball and the flag
to promote the global myth while allowing
local brands (e.g., Empresas Polar brewery of
Venezuela, Presidente Beer of the Dominican
Republic), to take advantage of simultaneous
nationalistic phenomena and initiate, activate,
and leverage sponsorships (Fisher, 2006b; King,
2006).
Three exceptional instances to the global
myth existed: Cuba, a nation in which baseball
is at the cultural core but whose economy
is extremely weak and whose Communistcontrolled government heavily sanctions/is
heavily sanctioned by governments worldwide,
thereby making sponsorships a virtual
impossibility (despite access to U.S. television);
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Puerto Rico, which is a baseball hotbed and, as
a U.S. territory, was ripe for and heavily targeted
for promotional activation by MLB sponsors
Gillette, MasterCard, and Pepsi during the
WBC; and South Africa, a nation with both a
relatively weak economy and a weak baseball
presence (King, 2006).
Social Responsibility
The third dimension associated with a global
brand as identified by Holt et al. (2004) is its
perceived level of social responsibility. Holt
et al. (2004) indicate that consumers perceive
global companies to wield considerable social
influence and should directly address problems
linked to their industries. In conjunction with
the WBC, MLB did both.
From the profits generated by the
tournament, the WBC donated $1.2 million
to Habitat for Humanity International (HHI)
to aid victims of the hurricanes that struck
the Gulf Coast region of the U.S. in 2005
and support the building of 16 homes (MLB.
com, 2006). Previous MLB efforts tied to HHI
included 21 additional homes built in 2006
and the provision of over $10 million in media
exposure for HHI (MLB.com, 2006).
In another instance involving the WBC, MLB
wielded its influence to address the problem of
Cuban participation in its tournament. While
Cuban players are not banned from playing
for MLB teams, the franchises must not be
involved in defection efforts, which are illegal
(Frankel, 2005); this dilemma has created past
outcries concerning the civil rights of Cuban
players, whose country is heavily sanctioned
by the U.S. Department of State. The state
department initially barred the participation
of the Cuban team in the WBC, but MLB
successfully negotiated a reversal of that policy
in time for the Cuban team to participate
(Fatsis, 2006).
Future efforts in this area will likely prove
critical for the expansion of MLB’s global
presence, particularly since it is an American
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brand (Holt et al., 2004). Socially responsible
initiatives in later years must provide clear
benefits for other (if not all) nations involved
in the tournament or other countries/regions
in need; otherwise, consumers may see the
approaches as opportunistic and self-interested
(Holt et al., 2004). Also, MLB must seek to
partner with socially responsible corporate
sponsors, which can be uniquely perceived
according to person, country, and region. For
instance, numerous breweries were involved in
WBC sponsorships at the global and national
levels, and Nike was the official team uniform
and equipment supplier of semifinalist Korea
(Fisher, 2005, 2006b; King, 2006).
Customer Segments
Holt et al.’s (2004) study also coined four
major segments of consumers based upon how
they relate to and evaluate global brands: global
citizens, global dreamers, antiglobals, and global
agnostics.
Global Citizens
This segment of consumers, which was
composed of about 55% of Holt et al.’s
(2004) respondents, is concerned about firms’
behavior regarding social issues and relies on
companies’ global successes as a signal of
quality and innovation. Relatively few of these
consumers are found in the U.S. and United
Kingdom, while relatively high numbers are
found in Brazil, China, and Indonesia (Holt et
al., 2004).
MLB has taken a primary first step in
positioning itself as a globally successful brand
simply by staging the WBC as a platform for
the best players to compete on behalf of their
countries in a World Cup-style tournament that
produced global exposure for the game and
MLB (Fisher, 2005; Lefton, 2006). One way
in which MLB can appeal to global citizens
via the WBC is to continue to actively pursue
and promote its involvement with socially
responsible initiatives, such as its involvement
with Habitat for Humanity International as
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described in the previous section. MLB has also
formed a multi-year sponsorship agreement
with KPMG, a Swiss global cooperative
network that provides audit, tax, and advisory
services in 148 countries, to become an
official MLB sponsor and presenting sponsor
of Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI), a
youth outreach program designed to increase
participation in baseball and softball, encourage
academic achievement, develop self-esteem,
and teach teamwork to urban youths (“About
KPMG,” 2007; “KPMG,” 2007). Under the
agreement, KPMG will work with MLB to
enhance and expand RBI through partnership
fees, an annual contribution of $1,000,000,
volunteer hours, and its corporate citizenship
program (“KPMG,” 2007).
Global Dreamers
The second category, which constituted 23%
of Holt et al.’s (2004) respondents, consists
of consumers who see global brands as a
source of quality products, readily accept the
myths authored by brands, are less discerning
about and more ardent in their admiration of
transnational companies, and are not nearly as
concerned with corporate response to social
issues.
With the WBC, MLB has authored a highly
attractive connectivity device for this group
of consumers as it promotes the tournament
as a vibrant, forceful, irresistible combination
of baseball and national flags (King, 2006).
In countries in which baseball is as much
culture as it is sport, the passion generated
by international baseball competition and the
marketing buzz and hype it generated in its
inaugural tournament, not to mention what
its second and subsequent tournaments may
potentially generate through the affinity of
nationalism, MLB has created a timely, welltargeted platform from which it can easily and
effectively reach global dreamers (Bloom, 2006;
Fatsis, 2006; King, 2006; Lefton, 2006).

Antiglobals
This segment of consumers, which
number about 13% of respondents in Holt
et al.’s (2004) study, try to avoid transnational
companies’ products because they are skeptical
that such companies can deliver higher quality
goods to them. Their numbers are relatively
high in the United Kingdom and China, and
relatively low in Egypt and South Africa (Holt
et al., 2004).
Concerning MLB and the sport of baseball,
this type of consumer may not necessarily
be focused upon the quality level of goods;
instead, their antiglobal mindset may be
more directed at the quality of baseball as a
sport and its (lack of) relevance and appeal to
them. Additionally, they may be less inclined
to sample the game, either as a participant
or spectator. Such an approach may be more
prevalent in countries with a weak baseball
presence. Therefore, MLB must carefully
design its promotional efforts to emphasize
elements other than ones that are highly (even
inherently) culturally relevant in other nations.
For example, in countries such China, Italy, and
South Africa in which baseball is barely on the
sporting radar, MLB emphasized the highly
valued element of international competition
associated with the WBC (Fatsis, 2006).
Grassroots playing efforts (Fatsis, 2006; King,
2006) are also essential to successfully sway this
group of consumers.
Global Agnostics
The fourth category, which comprised 8%
of Holt et al.’s (2004) respondents, consists of
consumers who do not regard brands’ global
natures as meriting special consideration and
do not make purchases based on brands’ global
attributes. These consumers are found in
relatively greater numbers in the U.S. and South
Africa and lesser in China, Japan, Indonesia,
and Turkey (Holt et al., 2004).
While pure correlations to global agnostics
as described by Holt et al. (2004) may not
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be found in accounts of the WBC, agnostic
attitudes about the tournament abounded,
specifically within the U.S. among some MLB
powers and baseball journalists. Skepticism
about potential injuries to multimillion-dollar
players, the Spring Training timing of the
tournament, and a lack of national interest
dissipated over the 17 days that the games were
played but flamed high before and during its
initial stages (Bloom, 2006; Fatsis, 2006). Even
the baseball-crazed country of Japan decided
to enter the tournament only at the last minute
(Fisher, 2006b).
Journalistically, the most optimistic preClassic outlook on the WBC came from
Boston Globe sports editor Joe Sullivan, who
said the newspaper was “sort of guarded in
our commitment” because of the uncertainty
over the WBC’s exact nature but was prepared
to “ramp up” its coverage if needed (Fisher,
2006a, ¶12).
Other journalistic perspectives were much
more pessimistic. Dan Graziano, a columnist
for the Newark, New Jersey, Star-Ledger
newspaper, said the WBC was no goodwill
exhibition like the Olympic Games but rather
a money-making scheme conceived by Selig
(Fisher, 2006a). On February 28, 2006, sports
radio talk show host Mike Francesca grilled
Tim Brosnan, MLB’s executive vice president
for business, for 20 minutes on New York
City’s dominant WFAN-AM radio station.
Francesca began by labeling the Classic “a
foolish enterprise” and asking Brosnan, “You
want [fans] to invest in a game that can end
in a tie?” (games in the first two rounds of
the WBC deadlocked after 14 innings were to
count as a tie, though none lasted that long)
(Fisher, 2006b, ¶3). Francesca asserted that the
WBC would never be top-flight competition
given its rules modifications, including pitchcount limits, and closed the interview by saying
Brosnan “lives in Never Never Land” (Fisher
2006a, ¶4 ).
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Later that same day, New York Yankees
owner George Steinbrenner, who cast the
lone abstaining vote among MLB owners
regarding the establishment of the WBC, called
the tournament “bull----” and complained
that MLB players would not be insured while
competing, an assertion denied by Archey’s
claim that MLB and MLBPA had purchased
supplemental insurance on WBC players
(Fisher, 2006a, ¶6 , 2006b).
MLB’s Consideration of Cultural Production
In 2006, Venkatesh and Meamber proposed
a theory postulating marketing as the context
and framework for the functioning of cultural
production as related to the marketing of
aesthetics, specifically within the arts. When
examined conjunctively of Holt et al.’s (2004)
global brand consumer segments, their theory
clearly has strong implication for MLB in its
efforts to market itself globally.
Cultural Production
Lash and Urry (2002) define cultural
production as the process by which cultural
products (goods, services, artifacts, visual/
experiential objects, and art forms) are created,
transformed, and diffused in the constitution
of consumer culture. Besides the creation of
physical products, symbols and meanings are
also created by consumers, who purchase goods
as much for meaning as functionality (Douglas
& Isherwood, 1979; Venkatesh & Meamber,
2006). As described by Schirato (2007), sport in
general (and baseball in particular) could easily
be considered a cultural industry that produces
a cultural product, i.e., ones with artistic/
aesthetic appeal and meanings (Kozinets, 2001,
2002; McCracken, 1988).
One central premise to cultural production
is that culture is constructed and negotiated
by cultural actors, including: producers, who
design, develop, and implement cultural
products; intermediaries, individuals or
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organizations concerned with communication
and distribution; and consumers, who
transform cultural products into objects of
meaning. These constructs are the product
of the interaction of symbolic and sensory
experience modes and the related meaning
systems in which cultural actors are engaged
(Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).
Marketing Approaches to Cultural Production
From 31 sources in literature, Venkatesh
and Meamber (2006) assimilated four distinct
approaches to marketing and consumption of
cultural production: the managerial orientation,
in which marketing principles are applied to
cultural product consumption; consumption
orientation, which includes experiential,
symbolic, and hedonic components; everyday
life orientation, in which arts/aesthetic
consumption occurs in everyday life situations;
and cultural product orientation, in which
cultural products provide insights into
consumer culture. The progression of these
perspectives is oriented in the premise that an
aesthetic experience (i.e., the sport of baseball
in the context of this paper) is based on
sensory elements but is also highly symbolic,
thus leading to a different consumer response
when compared to more mundane objects
(Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).
Managerial Orientation
With Kotler’s (1972) generic concept of
marketing came a managerial approach of
marketing mix variables to cultural production,
including studies of motivators (Bamossy &
Semenik, 1981), family life cycle (Belk, 1986),
co-patronage (Belk & Andreasen, 1980), trust
and commitment (Garbarino & Johnson, 1999),
and image (Askegaard, 1999). In sum, this
perspective views marketing as an important
agent of cultural production. While viewed
as a significant direction for the cultural
production industry, several authors (Hirshman,
1983; Joy & Sherry, 2003, 2003b; McCracken,
1990) underscore various limitations of this

perspective, including patrons as culturebearers, cultural objects as artifacts, and the
sociocultural event nature of consumer/object
interactivity.
Consumption Orientation
Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) argue that
experiential-type products cannot simply rely
on manipulation of marketing mix variables
because problem-solving approaches fueled
by product marketing theory alone cannot
account for the need to engage in cultural
production for pleasure, which activates multisensory, fantasy, and emotional aspects of
consumer experiences during consumption
of arts/aesthetics. As individuals engage in
these consumptive behaviors, they collect
past meanings, negotiate future meanings,
and assemble present meanings from cultural
constructs such as family, religion, gender,
age, and tradition. Essentially, this perspective
considers the unique aspects of the marketing
of production and consumption of cultural
products (Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).
Everyday-Life Orientation
The third perspective builds upon the
second but contends that postmodernity
and democratization have facilitated cultural
product consumption into ordinary, everyday
experiences, i.e., life now imitates art and is now
more fleeting, experiential, and image-based
than before (Lipovetsky, 1983, 1994). Concisely,
this perspective considers marketing to be a
framework for cultural production (Venkatesh
& Meamber, 2006).
Cultural Product Orientation
The fourth perspective contends that the
substance of cultural products (e.g., film
plots, artworks, literary texts, advertising,
etc.) provides insights into various aspects
of consumption and consumer culture (e.g.,
materialism, nostalgia, and cultural myths)
(Holbrook, 2004; Holbrook & Grayson, 1986).
This perspective links aesthetic processes and
consumption practices as vehicles for individual

© 2009 • Journal of Sport Administration & Supervision • Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2009

87

Global Branding Strategy

and cultural identity construction, essentially
reversing the perspective of managerial
orientation by utilizing insights from the
content of cultural products to understand
marketing and consumer behavior (Venkatesh
& Meamber, 2006).
Applications to MLB’s Global Efforts
When combined with Holt et al.’s (2004)
global consumer segmentation, knowledge
of Venkatesh and Meamber’s (2006) four
perspectives on marketing and cultural
production could allow MLB to better direct its
WBC efforts in more precise, effective, efficient
ways. Discounting the unlikely-to-be-converted
global agnostics, MLB can effectively form
appeals to the remaining three global consumer
segments.
Appeals to global citizens, who are highly
cognizant of a brand’s global success and
its social responsibility, could be made
through cultural product marketing, whereby
consumers’ cultural orientation influences
their marketing orientation. Global dreamers,
who readily accept global myths and admire
transnational companies because they desire a
sense of belonging to a larger construct, could
be reached through everyday life-oriented
marketing, since these consumers likely
consume cultural production on a daily basis
and are very experience-driven and imageobsessed. The skeptical category of antiglobals,
who may find MLB and the sport of baseball
irrelevant to themselves, may be steered in the
direction of baseball through consumptionoriented marketing efforts. However, these
efforts must involve elements of considerable
scope, long-term orientation, multiple initiatives
with various focuses, and keen working
knowledge of ethnic cultures.
In this mode, MLB must be particularly
conscious of several basic cultural production
principles as it formulates marketing
strategies for some global audiences. First,
consumers purchase goods as much for
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meaning as functionality and perceptively
transform symbols into meaning (Douglas &
Isherwood, 1979). Second, the culture in which
individuals are engaged creates meaning for
everyday products, dictates the ways in which
meanings move through society to consumers,
and determines the priorities attached to
experiences and products by consumers
(McCracken, 1986; Venkatesh & Meamber,
2006). Third, cultural products that provide
symbolic meanings consistent with cultural
priorities are more likely to be accepted than
ones that do not (Venkatesh & Meamber,
2006).
The combined anti-global/consumptionorientation approach may prove particularly
vital for MLB when undertaking initiatives
involving China, where baseball was introduced
in 1863, was visited by Major League stars
such as Babe Ruth and Casey Stengel on
exhibition tours, and was played extensively
until the country’s Cultural Revolution under
Chairman Mao Zedong effectively sought to
erase anything considered Western from 19661976 (Henson, 2008a; Wade, 2008a). Therefore,
despite a six-team government-supported
China Baseball League that began its sixth
season in 2008, approximately 100,000 youths
involved in the sport throughout the country,
two MLB-sponsored youth academies, three
new venues built for the 2008 Olympic Games
in Beijing, and a team entered in the inaugural
WBC, baseball still suffers from large amounts
of indifference and apathy from the Chinese
public, which largely does not see the sport as
relevant to them (Henson, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c;
MacLeod, 2008; Wade, 2008a). Nevertheless,
the country’s familiarity with and passion for
the NBA cause MLB officials to feel optimistic
that, when combined with its 2008 exhibition
series between the Los Angeles Dodgers and
San Diego Padres in Beijing, the presence of
baseball in the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing,
China’s participation in the inaugural WBC,
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and its likely participation in the 2009 WBC,
it can open a door for itself in a country with
1.3 billion citizens (Bloom, 2008a; Henson,
2008b), particularly through utilization of one
of its primary strengths: its extensive media
operations, the importance of which was
underscored by Venkatesh and Meamber’s
(2006) theories on cultural production.
Principles Related to Global Media
In describing transnational media
corporations, Gershon (2005) states that
their principal commodity is information and
entertainment. Gershon (2005) further states
that these corporations have become salient
features of the modern global economic
landscape and actively promote the use of
media and telecommunications software and
hardware technology (e.g., broadcast and cable
television, Internet, music and film, direct
broadcast satellite, video games, recorded
programming) on a worldwide basis. This
assertion should not be surprising, given the
symbiotic relationship between sport and
media, in which a sport is distinguished by
media that cover it, and in which media attract
consumers and advertisers by promoting its
prestige and power (Moretti, 2005).
Increasingly, however, more brands have
become at least part-time media companies by
virtue of their marketing strategies, following
the lead of sport properties, which are often
given credit for pioneering this phenomenon
of not only producing content, but creating
communities and producing online tools
(Outing, 2007). This application follows the
theoretical premise of Venkatesh and Meamber
(2006), who stated that the communication
subsystem of the cultural production system
“involves creating and directing marketing
communications to cultural gatekeepers (such
as the media, a formal gatekeeper, and opinion
leaders, who are informal gatekeepers) and

finally to consumers” (p. 18).
With Major League Baseball Advanced
Media (MLBAM), the company created to
operate its digital assets, MLB is well positioned
strategically to control and distribute its product
on a global basis. Created in 2000 with a $2.7
million investment from each of MLB’s 30
clubs, MLBAM has helped define successful
digital media propagation not only for MLB
but other major sport properties with whom
it contracts, including Major League Soccer,
Association of Volleyball Professionals, World
Championship Sports Network (Olympic and
lifestyle sports), IceNetwork.com, Tiger Woods’
official mobile site, and CBS’s March Madness
On Demand (Fisher & Mickle, 2008). MLBAM
produced revenues of at least $380 million in
2007, up more than 60% from $236 in 2005,
and has streamed over 12,000 live events since
its inception in 2000, more than any other Web
site in the world (“MLB’s advanced,” 2007).
Since the proliferation of global media for
the development of new media-based fans
in new international markets now receives
considerable emphasis from most major sport
properties, MLB’s advanced media arm gives it
a strong tool with which to promote, distribute,
and reinforce WBC efforts and thereby grow
its brand globally (Fullerton, 2007). However,
as with most market-driven organizations’
attempts to effectively match media to
audiences as described by Cravens and Percy
(2006), it must effectively mold its approach
to providing media on a unique, locally
appropriate basis with Shani and Sandler’s
(1996) Sports Event Pyramid, Gillespie et al.’s
(2007) branding strategy, and Holt et al.’s (2004)
global customer segments to truly cast the
WBC as a global event (Shani & Sandler, 1996)
and MLB as an international brand (Gillespie
et al., 2007). Since uniqueness is less a function
of structural alternatives and more connected
to the wide range of operational and market
variables than influence distribution channel
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strategy, generalization about distribution
practices throughout the world becomes
impossible (Cravens, 2006). Designing channels
to reach international customers may require
adaptability, and even advanced Internet-era
technology may not always provide solutions
(Cravens, 2006).
Conclusions
Despite the current strengths of MLB and
the success of the 2006 World Baseball Classic,
much remains at stake for Major League
Baseball as it perpetuates its efforts to build
its brand globally. Though MLB has achieved
several noteworthy breakthroughs, several
international obstacles of considerable scope
remain to be conquered.
Noteworthy Breakthroughs
MLB has finalized plans for its second
staging of the WBC, scheduled to be played
during March 2009 in Tokyo, Japan; San Juan,
Puerto Rico; Toronto, Canada; and Mexico City,
Mexico (cites for second-round, semifinals, and
championship games are to be determined as
of this writing) and featuring the same 16team field as the inaugural 2006 WBC (Bloom,
2008a, 2008b). A few competitive structural and
rule changes have been introduced, including a
double-elimination format during the first two
rounds of play and bracket crossover semifinal
games, done to intensify the competitive
excitement of the tournament, according
to MLB officials (Bloom, 2008a, 2008b).
Perhaps the most notable future alteration of
the tournament includes its proposed field
expansion to 24 teams for 2013 that would
include qualifying rounds as prefaces to
primary competition and thereby potentially
grow and enhance worldwide interest in
the game (Bloom, 2008a). After the waves
of pre-tournament criticism and apathy the
WBC received, even MLB officials were quite
surprised at the intensity of play and interest
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the initial Classic received and consider the
mere presence of a second Classic a landmark
achievement (Bloom, 2008a).
Another success story spawned at least
indirectly by the WBC yet unconnected to MLB
is the Israel Baseball League (IBL), a six-team
professional baseball league that began play
June 24, 2007, and featured 120 players from
nine countries including the U.S., Canada,
Australia, Japan, Israel, and the Dominican
Republic. Larry Baras, a Boston-based
businessman, created the IBL and appointed
Dan Duquette, a former general manager of
the Boston Red Sox, to be its director of player
development (“Israel launches,” 2007). The six
teams completed a 45-game season and fielded
20 of its 120 players from Israel and, before
beginning its 2008 season, announced that eight
of its 2007 players had either been signed by
or invited to tryouts with professional teams
around the world (“Pro baseball,” 2007; IBL,
2008).
In response to why he formed the IBL,
Baras said that he wanted to get Israelis, not
just American immigrants, interested in the
game for the same reasons Americans do:
“To be with family, to enjoy the sound of the
bat, to see the ballet actions of the players”
(“Pro baseball,” 2007, ¶ 13). More profoundly,
however, Baras said that persisting for fans in a
country in which soccer is king and basketball
is a distant second cousin was not the only
motive for forming the league. He also stated
that the league hoped to develop enough local
talent to field an Israeli team in future WBC
competitions (“Pro baseball,” 2007).
Remaining International Obstacles
Many of the obstacles for the IBL within
Israel will be common and/or similar to ones
for MLB as it continues its push within certain
countries and regions of the world; China is
one such example. Conditions in China appear
to be somewhat iconic for most countries on
MLB’s radar, not to mention the importance
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of exposing the nation of 1.3 billion people to
baseball.
Particular focus has been cast upon bolstering
the Chinese national baseball team. In 2003,
MLB signed a development contract with
the Chinese Baseball Association (CBA) and
offers several youth development programs
in major Chinese cities (Henson, 2008c).
However, with baseball dropped from the
2012 Olympic Games and no guaranteed of
its restoration to the sports rosters of future
Games, almost no Chinese government support
for its development past the 2008 Olympics is
guaranteed, necessitating stronger supporting
relationships with baseball entities such as MLB
(Henson, 2008a; MacLeod, 2008).
Additionally, MLB must continue to find ways
to develop the game beyond the national team
level (MacLeod, 2008). While baseball clubs
are enjoying popularity at Chinese universities,
baseball is considered an elite sport in China
because of the specialized, expensive, hardto-find equipment and fields (Henson, 2008b;
Wade, 2008). Thus far, MLB’s programs have
been restricted to major Chinese cities and
presently have virtually none of the rural
penetration throughout the vast territories of
China that exists in the U.S. and Latin American
countries (Henson, 2008a). Because baseball is
not broadcast on Chinese television, MLB fans
there must follow the sport online, where MLB
fortunately enjoys a strong presence (Henson,
2008b).
In addition to revitalizing the culture
of baseball in China, despite its efforts to
boost the WBC, MLB must seek an effective
partnership with the International Baseball
Federation (IBAF), the global governing
body of baseball whose universal presence
exceeds that of MLB. With the end of the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games came serious
doubt about the sport of baseball’s continued
future presence as an Olympic sport, despite
the fact that competitive baseball is played in

half the International Olympic Committee
member countries (Genzale, 2008), and the
game has more international participants and
fans than almost any other Olympic sport.
Numerous sources (Astelford, 2008; Blair,
2008; Fisher, 2008a; “MLB’s Return,” 2008)
documented MLB’s less-than-cooperative
relationship with the IABF in providing top-tier
player talent for 2008 Olympic competition,
as well as considering the possibility of a brief
Olympic-year shutdown if Chicago or Tokyo
were awarded the 2016 Olympic Games.
Accordingly, minor league and college baseball
players dotted the rosters of most national
teams in Beijing, generating little global interest
in tournament competition deemed second-rate
(Genzale, 2008). Such a lackluster competition
is blamed for baseball’s removal from the
next Olympic Games in 2010, which directly
endangers sources of funding for national
baseball associations around the world and
may indirectly endanger participation in many
baseball-playing countries around the world
(Blair, 2008).
MLB’s disregard for the present state of
international baseball as governed by the IBAF
is intense and has a history (Blair, 2008). Under
the leadership of Aldo Notari, who served
as IBAF’s president from 1993-2006 and
detested the intrusion of commercialism and
entertainment into the game, the federation
wilted into a bureaucracy with rampant
malfeasance, secrecy, and disorganization that
stunted the global growth of the game and has
forced MLB to undo extensive damage done
by the longtime impeding presence of such an
inefficient, ineffective organization (Genzale,
2007). However, under the current leadership
of long-time international sports executive
Harvey Schiller, the IBAF has reelected its
board of directors and refocused its mission to
develop an open organization, develop baseball
around the world (particularly in Europe and
Asia), and somehow return the sport to the
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Olympics after the 2010 London Olympic
Games (Astleford, 2008; Genzale, 2007).
A Springboard to the Future
This annular discussion of the WBC must
also conclude with the initial theoretical
framework with which it began. MLB’s
promotional efforts for the WBC must become
rooted in a thorough understanding of Shani
and Sandler’s (1996) Sports Event Pyramid
and the characteristics of events that occupy
each tier so that the WBC can ascend over
time to a level appropriate for maximizing the
tournament’s potential. Understanding how to
extend the sport’s width in developing markets
(e.g., China and European nations) will become
paramount, while extending its depth will be
the overriding factor in others (Pan American
nations, Japan, Korea, and even in the U.S.).
The sport of baseball occupies somewhat
of a middling position on both spectra. For
example, the sport does not enjoy the same
global reach as soccer or basketball, but it
does possess greater reach than sports such as
American football and probably is on relatively
equal worldwide footing with sports such as
hockey and golf. Event-wise, with its encore in
2009, the WBC will probably attain legitimate
consideration for international event status as
defined by Shani and Sandler (1996), placing
it on equal footing with events they used as
examples, such as the UEFA Cup, Wimbledon,
and the Tour de France. What must be duly
noted, however, is the annual staging of such
events, compared with the planned quadrennial
staging of the WBC after 2009. Fortunately for
MLB, examples provided by Shani and Sandler
(1996) of events on the top-shelf global tier
of sporting events are all quadrennials (e.g., the
Olympic games, FIFA World Cup).
The WBC also gives MLB an opportunity
to further distinguish itself globally among its
major American sport property peers. Though
its championship is labeled as the World Series,
that label is somewhat of a misnomer with
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the possible caveat that one MLB franchise is
located in Canada; in fact, Shani and Sandler
(1996) classify it as a national event, listed
on the third of the five tiers on their Sports
Events Pyramid (see Figure 1). Accordingly,
this championship event is quite less than likely
to garner high levels of worldwide attention.
Similarly, although the National Basketball
Association’s (NBA) NBA Finals championship
series boasts the crowning of a world champion
from among U.S. (and one Canadian) team, and
although the league and sport’s global widths
and depths are relatively strong, the lack of a
true world champion likely impedes its capacity
as a global branding promotional strategy. In
the case of still another domestic MLB peer,
the National Football League (NFL), which is
widely regarded as the leading American sport
property, stages the most highly rated annual,
single-game championship event in the U.S.
called the Super Bowl, which, by virtue of its
status as an American demi-holiday, receives a
moderate amount of worldwide acclaim despite
its lack of width outside North America.
Nevertheless, it, too, lacks the complete list
of ingredients listed by Shani and Sandler
(1996) to generate a high level of interest
among a significant portion of the population
(enormous resource requisite, extended staging
period).
In addition to the finalized domestic and
international media rights deals for the 2009
WBC tournament that were estimated to
be worth $40 million-$50 million, MLB and
MLBPA organized a series of aggressive
promotional events for the 2009 WBC at its
four North American WBC sites (Los Angeles,
Miami, San Diego, Toronto) as the 2008
MLB season concluded (Fisher, 2008b; Fisher
& Ourand, 2008; “World Baseball,” 2008).
Coupled with its previously discussed apparent
disinterest in Olympic baseball investments,
these factors clearly signal that MLB has
begun to realize the potential of the WBC as
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a promotional strategy for its global branding
efforts.
In an article previewing the sponsorship
potential of the 2006 Olympic Winter Games,
Woodward (2005) posits that the perceived
value of the Olympic Games is a multibillion
dollar investment that is leveraged by
governments, corporations, and broadcasters
continues to rise. In summary, this premise
underscores the importance of MLB’s efforts
to establish itself as a viable international
brand and cultivate markets around the world.
To effectively do so, establishing the presence
of the WBC as global sport event becomes
imperative to MLB’s future success.
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Research problem
This paper analyzes the 2006 World Baseball Classic (WBC) as a promotional strategy by Major League Baseball
to further its global branding pursuits. According to Paul Archey, MLB’s senior vice president of international
business operations, the purpose of the WBC was to “build a platform where the best players in the game could
play on behalf of their countries and get baseball better global exposure.”
Several theoretical frameworks involving global management and marketing practices are utilized to analyze the
WBC, with certain analyses considering the interaction of multiple frameworks, including sport event scope (Shani
& Sandler, 1996), a four-step global brand strategy (Gillespie, Jeannet, & Hennessey, 2007), consumer evaluations
of global brands, global consumer segments (Holt, Quelch, & Taylor, 2004), cultural production (Venkatesh &
Meamber, 2006), and principles related to global media (Gershon, 2005).
This article would likely be useful to sport marketers, particularly those seeking to expand a property on an
international/global scale, or by brand managers seeking to partner with a global sport property. Event managers
with the same purposes may also find the article helpful.
Issues
Precise definitions for the term globalization vary considerably and include descriptive elements encompassing
the integration of markets for goods, services, capital, technology, information, historical and political shifts, social
and cultural processes, human mobility, and organizations. Regardless of their precise definitions, consensus exists
among later expert writings on globalization, indicating that the phenomenon cannot be accurately characterized by
singular definitions of the term and that these processes are each evolving concurrently, are frequently overlapping,
and are often are reinforcing one other, thereby creating a simultaneously problematic and promising environment.
Like most American sport properties, MLB is no stranger to far-reaching global business initiatives in recent
decades. Modern sport crosses international boundaries with increasing regularity due to the influx of worldwide
talent, global television audiences, and greater access to licensed merchandise. Accordingly, globalization has become
a top priority of all major U.S. sports properties as they seek growth outside American borders both to showcase
their sports to international audience and to increase consumption of their own particular product(s). Other
primary causes for the increased emphasis on globalization by American sport properties are the maturation of
American sports markets and the relatively unsaturated nature of overseas sports markets, as well as technological
advances and availability, which increase international accessibility.

Event Scope
Precise use of the terms global and international becomes paramount when determining the exact context of
an event. Shani and Sandler (1996) offer a five-tiered classification system called “The Sports Event Pyramid” (see
Figure 1) based on two criteria: width, or the geographic reach of the event; and depth, or the level of interest
in the event, which may be great or low. Accordingly, the top tier of events includes ones with worldwide width
coupled with great depth, which are classified as global events, e.g., the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup.
Second-tier events on the are classified as international events; these events may have: national width and great
depth, e.g., the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup in soccer; or global width with low depth,
e.g., the Wimbledon tennis tournament and the Tour de France bicycle race.
Brand Scope
Gillespie et al. (2007), contend that a global brand implements a marketing strategy that is standardized across all
national markets yet adapts key elements of the marketing mix (e.g., product features, distribution, and promotion)
to local tastes, while an international brand follows a general global strategy but does not maintain a strictly
standardized marketing strategy or marketing mix across all national markets.
When considering Shani and Sandler’s (1996) Sports Event Pyramid and Gillespie et al.’s (2007) branding
distinction together, MLB must contextualize the WBC as a global event with worldwide width and great depth,
but because of the varying impact of the sport of baseball around the world, MLB must market itself as an
international brand. Specific reasons why MLB must market itself with differentiated marketing strategies and
marketing mixes are detailed in the following discussion about the WBC global branding strategy, consumer
evaluations of global brands, and MLB’s consideration of cultural production.
Summary
Four Steps In Global Branding
Gillespie et al. (2007) advocate four steps in developing and administering a global brand: identifying consumer
needs, communicating brand identity, tracking global brand identity, and determining the movement of branding
decisions. These four steps can clearly be seen when examining MLB’s construct of the WBC.
In the initial step, a firm must identify recurring customer needs worldwide and determine how its brand can
bring both functional and emotional benefits to these customers. Emotional benefits of the inaugural WBC were
well documented by media accounts of the unbridled nationalism by fans attending WBC games. Such passion was
also a critical measure of success for WBC sponsors, who in some cases had directly pinned the success of their
marketing campaigns to the transference of the passion generated by the implosion of nationalism and the sport of
baseball directly to their brands.
The second step proposed by Gillespie et al. (2007) is the establishment of a process to communicate the brand’s
identity to consumers, channels, and the firm’s own employees. Concerning the WBC, MLB did this on both bigpicture and small-picture levels. From a gestalt perspective, MLB officials and other experts clearly indicated that
the purpose of the WBC was to build a bridge to audiences outside the United States, along with other exhibition
initiatives, including an exhibition series in China and Opening Day games in Japan. Aside from these big-picture
efforts to communicate brand identity, specific immediate steps were also taken to drive the MLB/WBC message,
including collaboration with powerful media partners like ESPN.
The third step proposed by Gillespie et al. (2007) is the establishment of a method for tracking the success of
the global identity of the brand and monitoring customers’ opinions. Fortunately for MLB, a multitude of both
traditional and cutting-edge options are at its disposal, including traditional measures of television ratings and ticket
sales, which were reported to be the primary focus of some MLB executives, and media traffic patterns created by
new media.
The fourth and final step proposed by Gillespie et al. (2007) in developing and administering a global brand
strategy is to determine the direction of the movement of branding decisions, which may be either of two
directions: the top-down approach, in which a global management team determines the global brand strategy from
which country-specific branding strategies are derived; or the bottom-up approach, in which country strategies
emerge from shared experiences and best practices across common elements among subsidiaries. Though global

movement on the MLB brand is clearly a top-shelf priority of its upper-level management team, regarding this
fourth step, MLB is apparently building unique, individualized, country-specific strategies that reflect a bottom-up
approach in branding decisions. MLB international marketing and development personnel indicate that strategies
and dynamics of selling the game must be customized not by continent and region but by country, a branding
strategy at least 15 years old (King, 2006).
Consumer Evaluations of Global Brands
Based on a study of brand preferences and perceptions of consumers across the globe, Holt et al. (2004)
offered a theoretical construct of three important dimensions of global brands (quality signal, global myth, and
social responsibility) and categorized global consumer segments into four groups (global citizens, global dreamers,
antiglobals, and global agnostics), both of which can clearly be illustrated by an examination of MLB’s efforts with
the WBC.
Regarding the first dimension of quality signal, Holt et al. (2004) concluded that international consumers
are impressed by brands’ quality, excitement, innovation, and global reach. MLB’s launch of an international
tournament dually qualifies as a new/breakthrough initiative and a direct effort to drive international perception of
the sport of baseball as a global one.
The second dimension of global brands is a brand’s capability to create a shared global identity that gives
consumers a perceived cosmopolitan lifestyle, known as global myth, in which they share an imagined global
identity with like-minded people, feel a sense of belonging to something bigger, and ascribe to desired qualities. A
careful analysis of the 2006 WBC team/country profiles compiled by King (2006) reveals that MLB utilized global
myth regarding the WBC to nations outside the U.S. with two distinct combinations of two variables: emphasis on
competition and sources of sponsorships.
The third dimension associated with a global brand is its perceived level of social responsibility. Holt et al. (2004)
indicate that consumers perceive global companies to wield considerable social influence and should directly address
problems linked to their industries. In conjunction with the WBC, MLB did both. From the profits generated by
the tournament, the WBC donated $1.2 million to Habitat for Humanity International (HHI) to aid victims of
the hurricanes that struck the Gulf Coast region of the U.S. in 2005 and support the building of 16 homes. In
another instance involving the WBC, MLB wielded its influence to address the problem of Cuban participation in
its tournament. The U.S. State Department initially barred the Cuban team’s participation in the WBC, but MLB
successfully negotiated a reversal of that policy in time for the Cuban team to participate.
Customer Segments
Holt et al.’s (2004) study also coined four major segments of consumers based upon how they relate to and
evaluate global brands: global citizens, global dreamers, antiglobals, and global agnostics.
Global Citizens, which composed about 55% of Holt et al.’s (2004) respondents, are concerned about firms’
behavior regarding social issues and rely on companies’ global successes as a signal of quality and innovation.
Relatively few of these consumers are found in the U.S. and United Kingdom, while relatively high numbers
are found in Brazil, China, and Indonesia. MLB has taken a primary first step in positioning itself as a globally
successful brand simply by staging the WBC as a platform for the best players to compete on behalf of their
countries.
Global Dreamers, which constituted 23% of Holt et al.’s (2004) respondents, are consumers who see global
brands as a source of quality products, readily accept the myths authored by brands, are less discerning about
and more ardent in their admiration of transnational companies, and are not nearly as concerned with corporate
response to social issues. With the WBC, MLB has authored a highly attractive connectivity device for this group
of consumers as it promotes the tournament as a vibrant, forceful, irresistible combination of baseball and national
flags.
Antiglobals, which number about 13% of respondents in Holt et al.’s (2004) study, try to avoid transnational
companies’ products because they are skeptical that such companies can deliver higher quality goods to them. Their
numbers are relatively high in the United Kingdom and China, and relatively low in Egypt and South Africa (Holt
et al. 2004). Concerning MLB and the sport of baseball, this type of consumer may not necessarily be focused
upon the quality level of goods; instead, their antiglobal mindsets may be more directed at the quality of baseball
as a sport and its (lack of) relevance and appeal to them. Additionally, they may be less inclined to sample the game,

either as a participant or spectator. Such an approach may be more prevalent in countries with a weak baseball
presence. Therefore, MLB must carefully design its promotional efforts to emphasize elements other than ones that
are highly (even inherently) culturally relevant in other nations.
Global Agnostics, which comprised of 8% of Holt et al.’s (2004) respondents, are consumers who do not
regard brands’ global nature as meriting special consideration and do not make purchases based on brands’ global
attributes. These consumers are found in relatively greater numbers in the U.S. and South Africa and lesser in China,
Japan, Indonesia, and Turkey (Holt et al. 2004).
MLB’s Consideration of Cultural Production
Venkatesh and Meamber (2006) proposed that marketing is the context and framework for cultural production as
related to the marketing of aesthetics, specifically within the arts. When examined together wtih Holt et al.’s (2004)
global brand consumer segments, their theory clearly has strong implication for MLB in its efforts to market itself
globally.
From 31 sources in literature, Venkatesh and Meamber (2006) assimilated four distinct approaches to marketing
and consumption of cultural production: the managerial orientation, in which marketing principles are applied
to cultural product consumption; consumption orientation, which includes experiential, symbolic, and hedonic
components; everyday life orientation, in which arts/aesthetic consumption occurs in everyday life situations; and
cultural product orientation, in which cultural products provide insights into consumer culture. The progression of
these perspectives is oriented in the premise that an aesthetic experience (i.e., the sport of baseball in the context of
this paper) is based on sensory elements but is also highly symbolic, thus leading to a different consumer response
when compared to more mundane objects (Venkatesh & Meamber, 2006).
When combined with Holt et al.’s (2004) global consumer segmentation, knowledge of Venkatesh and Meamber’s
(2006) four perspectives on marketing and cultural production could allow MLB to better direct its WBC efforts
in more precise, effective, efficient ways. Discounting the unlikely-to-be-converted global agnostics, MLB can
effectively form appeals to the remaining three global consumer segments.
Principles Related to Global Media
In describing transnational media corporations, Gershon (2005) states that their principal commodity is
information and entertainment. Gershon (2005) further states that these corporations have become salient features
of the modern global economic landscape and actively promote the use of media and telecommunications software
and hardware technology (e.g., broadcast and cable television, Internet, music and film, direct broadcast satellite,
video games, recorded programming) on a worldwide basis. Increasingly, however, more brands have become at
least part-time media companies by virtue of their marketing strategies, following the lead of sport properties,
which are often given credit for pioneering this phenomenon of not only producing content, but creating
communities and producing online tools.
With Major League Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM), the company created to operate its digital assets, MLB
is well positioned strategically to control and distribute its product on a global basis. Created in 2000 with a $2.7
million investment from each of MLB’s 30 clubs, MLBAM has helped define successful digital media propagation
not only for MLB but other major sport properties with whom it contracts. MLBAM produced revenues of at
least $380 million in 2007, up more than 60% from $236 in 2005, and has streamed over 12,000 live events since its
inception in 2000, more than any other Web site in the world.
Discussions/Implications
Despite the current strengths of MLB and the success of the 2006 World Baseball Classic, much remains at stake
for Major League Baseball as it perpetuates its efforts to build its brand globally. Though MLB has achieved several
noteworthy breakthroughs, several international obstacles of considerable scope remain to be conquered.
Noteworthy Breakthroughs
MLB has finalized plans for its second staging of the WBC, scheduled for March 2009 in Tokyo, Japan; San Juan,
Puerto Rico; Toronto, Canada; Mexico City, Mexico (cites for second-round, semifinals, and championship games
are to be determined as of this writing) and featuring the same 16-team field as the inaugural 2006 WBC. Perhaps
the most notable future alteration of the tournament includes its proposed field expansion to 24 teams for 2013

that would include qualifying rounds as prefaces to primary competition and thereby potentially grow and enhance
worldwide interest in the game.
Another success story spawned at least indirectly by the WBC yet unconnected to MLB is the Israel Baseball
League (IBL), a six-team professional baseball league that began play June 24, 2007, and featured 120 players from
nine countries including the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel, and the Dominican Republic. The six teams
completed a 45-game season and fielded 20 of its 120 players from Israel and, before beginning its 2008 season,
announced that eight of its 2007 players had either been signed by or invited to tryouts with professional teams
around the world.
Remaining International Obstacles
Many of the obstacles for the IBL within Israel will be common and/or similar to ones for MLB as it continues
its push within certain countries and regions of the world; China is one such example. Conditions in China appear
to be somewhat iconic for most countries on MLB’s radar, not to mention the importance of exposing the nation
of 1.3 billion people to baseball.
Particular focus has been cast upon bolstering the Chinese national baseball team. In 2003, MLB signed a
development contract with the Chinese Baseball Association (CBA) and offers several youth development programs
in major Chinese cities. However, with baseball dropped from the 2012 Olympic Games and no guaranteed of its
restoration to the sports rosters of future Games, almost no Chinese government support for its development past
the 2008 Olympics is guaranteed, necessitating stronger supporting relationships with baseball entities such as MLB.
Additionally, MLB must continue to find ways to develop the game beyond the national team level. In addition
to revitalizing the culture of baseball in China, despite its efforts to boost the WBC, MLB must seek an effective
partnership with the International Baseball Federation (IBAF), the global governing body of baseball whose
universal presence exceeds that of MLB, despite a historically icy relationship between them.
A Springboard to the Future
This discussion of the WBC must conclude with the initial theoretical framework with which it began. MLB’s
promotional efforts for the WBC must become rooted in a thorough understanding of Shani and Sandler’s (1996)
Sports Event Pyramid and the characteristics of events that occupy each tier so that the WBC can ascend over time
to a level appropriate for maximizing the tournament’s potential. Understanding how to extend the sport’s width in
developing markets (e.g., China and European nations) will become paramount, while extending its depth will be the
overriding factor in others (Pan American nations, Japan, Korea, and even in the U.S.).
The WBC also gives MLB an opportunity to further distinguish itself globally among its major American sport
property peers. Though its championship is labeled as the World Series, that label is somewhat of a misnomer with
the possible caveat that one MLB franchise is located in Canada; in fact, Shani and Sandler (1996) classify it as a
national event, listed on the third of the five tiers on their Sports Events Pyramid. Accordingly, this championship
event is quite less than likely to garner high levels of worldwide attention.
In addition to the finalized domestic and international media rights deals for the 2009 WBC tournament that were
estimated to be worth $40 million-$50 million, MLB and MLBPA organized a series of aggressive promotional
events for the 2009 WBC at its four North American WBC sites as the 2008 MLB season concluded. Coupled with
its previously discussed apparent disinterest in Olympic baseball investments, these factors clearly signal that MLB
has begun to realize the potential of the WBC as a promotional strategy for its global branding efforts.
In summary, this article underscores the importance of MLB’s efforts to establish itself as a viable international
brand and cultivate markets around the world. To effectively do so, establishing the presence of the WBC as global
sport event becomes imperative to MLB’s future success.

